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A POLITICAL ECONOMY CRITIQUE
OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE*
Gerben DeJong
Brandeis University
ABSTRACT
Despite its rapid expansion over the last decade, the American welfare
state appears unable to remedy many of the social problems it has been
designated to solve. In many instances, the welfare state has become
as much a part of the problem as the solution. Unfortunately, most
proposals to reform the welfare state do not go beyond the liberal-
conservative conception of the welfare state as a backup to the
capitalist market system. This conception of the welfare state is part
of a larger comitment to a free market-pluralist ideology that singles
out certain social phenomena as problematic and limits the range of
interventions considered acceptable. Thus, the welfare state's ideo-
logical commitments create a built-in tendency to maintain the status
quo.
Political economy is presented here as a particular analytic perspective
that challenges the values and assumptions of the free market-pluralist
ideology and thus offers a critique of the American welfare state that
cannot be formulated within the free market-pluralist conception of
reality.
,
Based on a paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Society
for the Study of Social Problems, New York City, August 28, 1976.
I would like to thank Reginald K. Carter, David G. Gil, Elliott
Sclar, and Roland L. Warren for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this article.
INTRODUCTION
Many individuals and groups have acknowledged that various
sectors of the American welfare state are in need of reform but
few, except the most conservative, have been willing to declare
that the present welfare state is fundamentally unsound. This
pessimistic assessment is a far cry from the optimism that ushered
in the Great Society a decade ago. The underlying assumption of
the Great Society was that our social problems could be remedied
with a quantum expansion of the welfare state. During the past ten
years (1965-1975) we have seen the American welfare state expand
by $165.2 billion in constant dollars. (See Table 1.) In 1965 the
welfare state comprised 11.8 percent of our gross national product.
Ten years later it was 20.1 percent. Yet our social problems have
not withered away. In fact, it seems as if our social problems
increase in proportion to the size of the welfare state.
Consider two examples. First, in the area of income support
we have observed that the public assistance and social service
programs authorized under the Social Security Act have fostered
increasing economic dependency despite their avowed goal of making
people economically self-sufficient. In 1965, 7.1 million people
received public assistance payments. Ten years later, that figure
more than doubled to 15.5 million (U.S. Social Security Administra-
tion, 1976:66&70). Second, in the health care industry we have
seen how Medicare and Medicaid have contributed to the rising cost
of medical care thus threatening to price middle income groups out
of the health care market.1 The income protection goals of Medicare
IMany other features of the health economy are also contrib-
uting to the rise in the cost of medical care. Perhaps a more
accurate interpretation would be to say that health care providers
have taken advantage of the opportunities in Medicare and Medicaid
to raise costs. Nevertheless, the real spurt in the medical care
component of the Consumer Price Index did start in 1966, the year
in which Medicare and Medicaid became effective. (See, for example,
Stuart, et.al, 1973:49-52; U.S. Social Security Administration,
1976:79-80, Tables M-40 and M-41). Some argue that it is the
relative price increase of medical care and not the absolute increase
that is important. From that perspective, Medicare and Medicaid
are not seen as contributors to medical cost inflation, but instead,
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and Medicaid have been frustrated. The elderly who were assumed to
be among the major beneficiaries of these programs now spend the
same proportion of their own income foI medical care as they did
before these programs were introduced.
There have been two basic responses to the problems of the
welfare state. There is the conservative response that seeks to
dismantle the welfare state. Conservatives see the present situation
as an exoneration of their original position that the welfare
state should never have come into existence in the first place.
Liberals look at the present situation with a false sense of self-
confidence: program failure is seen as proof that either not
enough resources were allocated to do the job or that programs were
poorly administered.
Although an increasing number of "liberals" have become philo-
sophically disillusioned and are beginning to echo the "conservative"
refrain of self-reliance and fiscal frugality, the welfare state
is not about to collapse. First, many within the liberal 
establish-
ment are dependent on the generosity of the welfare state for their
own economic well-being. They are the professionals and service
providers. They are not likely to recommend solutions or reforms
that are inconsistent with their own economic and professional
interests. Second, the social problems the welfare state addresses
are real ones. In the absence of an alternative, government must
continue to ameliorate these problems the best it can. Failure 
to
do so is to risk increased social conflict.
Thus we are presented with two alternatives: less of the same
or more of the same. Yet, more and more of us have a nagging
suspicion that the problems of the welfare state are more complex
than that suggested by either of these two points of view. It is
my contention that the conservative and liberal critiques of the
welfare state are severely limiting and thus do not offer meaningful
solutions. The conservative and liberal conceptions only address
the symptoms and fail to deal with the underlying system that has
made the welfare state necessary in the first place.
are seen as one step along a long-term trend. This particular
analytic perspective is evident in Heagy, .al., (1976:20-23).
2 For a discussion on this point, see Harris (1975:19-22,
464-465).
THE FREE MARKET IDEOLOGY
Liberalism has sometimes been called the welfare state's official
ideology. However true this statement may be, the differences
between liberals and conservatives are small relative to their common
commitment to the free market system. It is this commitment that
shapes the welfare state and defines its role in society. Because
of its call for governmental intervention in the capitalist market
system, liberalism is usually not thought to be a free market
ideology. But this is to overlook the fact that liberalism takes
the market system as its point of departure. It believes that
economic and social dislocations are inevitable as the market adjusts
to new pressures and as the market moves to greater efficiency. The
role of government in the welfare state is to meet the needs of
those who become the casualties of these adjustments. There is
nothing intrinsically wrong with the market system but government
is needed to modify capitalism in order to minimize socially desta-
bilizing inequities.
It is the thesis of this article that the American welfare
state cannot be understood apart from its commitment to the free
market ideology that views the welfare state as a backstop to the
capitalist market system. The welfare state's ideological commit-
ments define both the problems and methods deemed appropriate for
intervention. Most efforts attempting to analyze the shortcomings
of the welfare state fail because they seldom go beyond the self-
limiting assumptions of the welfare state's ideological commitments.
By challenging the values and assumptions of these commitments,
political economy -- as a particular analytic perspective to be
described later -- offers an analysis that enables us to understand
the failures of the welfare state. Our failure to shift the debate
to these underlying values and assumptions in large part accounts
for our inability to deal with the problems of the welfare state.
Because the political economy critique of the American welfare
state cannot be wholly separated from its analysis of free market
ideology, it is necessary to describe in some detail the various
values and assumptions of that ideology.
Individualism
Free market ideology begins with certain assumptions about the
nature of humans and their relationship to the larger society. It
assumes that people are basically selfish, acquisitive, and act
primarily in their own self-interest. Such self-interest is said
to be rational: each individual seeks to maximize pleasure and
minimize pain. This utilitarian principle is the cornerstone of
modern consumer demand theory. In the parlance of neoclassical
economic theory, "man" is a utility maximizer: given a choice
between two commodities, A and B, an individual will choose those
quantitites of A and B that will maximize "his" utility subject to
the constraint of "his" income.
No value judgement can be made about the validity of each person's
interest. Each person is the best judge of his or her own interests;
individual utility is a personal matter. The satisfaction which
one individual receives cannot be compared to that received by a
second individual. In other words, interpersonal utility comparisons
are not possible.
Individual self-interest is also the basis for determining
societal well-being. Each person advances the community's interest
by persuing his or her own interests. Put the other way around,
the community's well-being is seen as a mere aggregation of indi-
vidual well-being. The importance of this lies in the fact that
since interpersonal utility comparisons cannot be made, there exists
no a priori or rational basis for income redistributioa. Thus,
redistribution tends to be limited to the most severe forms of
income deprivation.
Perfect Competition and its Modifications
Individual self-interest is translated into aggregate social
well-being through the vehicle of the competitive market. A market
is said to be competitive when certain criteria are met. If all
are met, then the market is considered to be "perfectly competitive."
The criteria for a perfectly competitive market are: (1) rational
self-interest, (2) perfect knowledge by buyers and sellers of all
present and future market conditions, (3) open access -- ease of
entry and exit into the market, (4) smallness -- no buyer or seller
sufficiently large to affect the price, and (5) undifferentiated
products.
Of course, these assumptions and conditions are never fully
attained in the real world. Nonetheless, to the extent to which
they are partially attained, it is felt that a sufficiently compe-
titive situation exists in whcih individual self-interest is, over
time, translated into aggregate social well-being. In cases
where the criteria are severely violated, such as monopoly and
oligopoly, it is usually held that these instances are isolated or
are necessary to the "public interest" as in the case of public
utilities.
3
Free market economics has always been sufficiently robust to
find some analytic justification for the existing distribution of
economic power. Yet the perfectly competitive market remains the
strictest construction of the free market ideology and the analytic
point of departure. Perfect competition is not only normative for
economic theory but also for political theory. Perfect competition
has its political analogue in the theory of democratic pluralism
where nearly identical assumptions obtain.
Democratic Pluralism
According to the pluralist model, the American political
process is one in which competing interests organize into groups
to rationally pursue their own interests by bargaining in the
political market place. The market is governed by certain rules or
"a procedural consensus."
The rules of the political market constitute the assumptions
of the pluralist model. One of the rules is that there be freedom
of entry and exit into the political market place. The open access
assumption requires that there be no single group capable of
denying other groups their right to participate in the political
process. In the pluralist model, power and control are sufficiently
distributed to prevent any group from becoming dominant, an
3Although monopoly, oligopoly, and other market models require
that the assumptions of perfect competition be relaxed, these models
or modifications do not pose a fundamental threat to the neoclassical
paradigm since all the tools of marginal analysis -- that are so
central to the methodology of contemporary economics -- are still
applicable.
Additional adjustments have been made to the perfect competition
model in the theory of countervailing power. According to this
theory, large and highly structured industries are not a matter of
special concern because "...private economic power begets the
countervailing power of those who are subjected to it" (Gailbraith,
1956:4). Countervailing powers tend to neutralize each other. Strong
labor unions neutralize the power of oligopolistic industries;
organized buyers neutralize powerful sellers. (Continued...)
assumption closely related to the premise in perfect competition
that no buyer or seller is sufficiently large to affect the price.
When one group seeks to advance its position by forming coalitions
with other groups, countervailing coalitions or forces are likely
to develop.
Bargaining is to the political process what bidding is to the
economic market. Because no group is sufficiently dominant in the
bargaining process, the various parties must compromise. By moving
to some compromise the system tends over time to be Pareto-optimal:
it will tend to make some groups better off without making others
worse off. Pareto-optimality is not a second-best solution but
the optimal solution. It constitutes the point of equilibrium -- the
point at which political and social harmony is achieved. Equilibrium
is the embodiment of the public interest.
In the pluralist system, the oscillations around a given issue
are fairly narrow always tending toward equilibrium. Changes are
seldom drastic but tend to be incremental or marginal. Such a
system is said to be self-regulating and inherently stable. The
automatic and mechanistic character of both perfect competition and
pluralism led Lowi (1969:47) to conclude that "[t]he hidden hand
of capitalistic ideology could clasp the hidden hand of pluralism,
and the two could shake affirmatively."
In the pluralist framework, the state is a neutral party to
the competition and the bargaining. The role of the state is to
enforce the rules of the game; to step in as an umpire only when
things get out of hand. The state acts as a stabilizer when the
system's automatic stabilizers malfunction.
(cont.)
The result, then, is a kind of market
equilibrium or invisible hand that
harmonizes the interests of all. The
harmonious whole is now simply made up
of a few neutralized giants rather than
numerous atomistically competitive small
firms (Hunt, 1972:156-157).
The countervailing power theory demostrates the adjustments
free market ideologists are prepared to make in order to preserve
a particular world view.
The neutrality of the state extends to the pluralist conception
of the welfare state. The role of the welfare state is not to take
sides, as for example, in the competition between labor and manage-
ment or in the relationship between doctor and patient. It only
acts as the supreme intermediary. By providing food stamp benefits
to strikers it allegedly takes sides in labor-management disputes.
On the other hand, by limiting its role to that of a financial
intermediary in the Medicare-Medicaid program, the welfare state does
not intrude in the doctor-patient relationship.
The pluralist model is also considered normative for decision
making within the welfare state. The welfare state is seen as an
entity comprised of competing interest groups -- consumers, providers,
taxpayers, public interest organizations, and others. Much of
welfare state policy is achieved through a bargaining process that
is later ratified as a fait accompli by the Congress or another
"neutral" authority having the power to enforce the terms of the
agreement.
A broader political economic conception of society leads one
to reject this view of pluralism and the welfare state. According
to the political economy critique, the free market-pluralist con-
ception of the welfare state obscures important social and economic
realities that ultimately compromises the effectiveness of welfare
state services.
III
CRITIQUE OF THE WELFARE STATE & ITS IDEOLOGY
As the term implies, political economy generally refers to the
study of the interrelationship between politics and economics.
Political economy, as I use it here, also refers to the study of
that interrelationship but in a more specific sense: I am referring
to a specific analytic paradigm that has developed over the last
decade within the economics profession as a reaction to the excesses
of neoclassical theory.
As an analytic paradigm, political economy has relied heavily
on Karl Marx's critique of capitalism and has also borrowed from
other traditions and disciplines. Although I may not agree with all
the assumptions of political economy, I believe that as an analytic
frame of reference, political economy does enable us to go beyond
the limits of conventional social policy analysis.
To describe all the elements that make up the political economy
paradigm is to go beyond the purpose of this article. Nonetheless,
the political economy literature (Behr, et al., 1971; Gintis, 1972;
Gordon, 1965; Gurley, 1971; Peabody, 1971; Sweezy, 1971; Weisskopf,
1971; Zwerg, 1971) suggests four main points around which we can
organize our discussion of the welfare state: (1) class conflict
and view of social change, (2) historicism and view of social
consciousness, (3) alienation and view of labor, and (4) communitar-
ianism and view of the individual. Together, these four rubrics
offer us a framework for both a critique of the free market-plural
ideology and a critique of the welfare state. In later sections
of this article, the effectiveness of political economy as an
analytic tool will be demonstrated from two selected sectors of the
American welfare state.
Class Conflict and Social Change
The major drawback to the free market-pluralist world view is
that is fails to take into account the fact that wealth and power
are unequally distributed within the social system. It consistently
views individuals and groups as having equal access to the political
and economic decision making process. A central fact often ignored
by pluralists is that those who come to the political marketplace
with disproportionate economic power usually have the intellectual
and political dexterity with which to maintain if not extend those
advantages in the bargaining process. Pluralism ignores the economic
basis of the political process. It assumes that the political arena
is economically neutral. It is not. Interest group politics are
usually loaded in favor of well-established minorities. As
Schattschneider (1975:34-35) pointed out: "The flaw in the pluralist
heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class
accent."
The exclusionary nature of the pluralist system also accounts
for much of its conservatism. A pluralist system that oscillates
within a few degrees of the point of equilibrium is not likelz to
tolerate large fluctuations in political thought or ideology.
4 Political economy rejects the equilibrium thesis of free
market-pluralist ideology. As observed here, the free market ideology
assumes that there are harmonies of interests and then investigates
the tendencies toward equilibrium. It assumes that change is gradual
and nondisruptive. For political economy the concepts of conflict,
struggle, and dialectic are most central, It assumes that under
_10-
Those already in the system have a vested interest in making sure
that the equilibrium is not upset. Pre-existing power or class
relationships are reinforced through marginal changes.
Put another way, the free market-pluralist ideology suffers
from a basic inconsistency in its assumptions: the open access and
rational self-interest assumptions are mutually exclusive. It is
always in the interest of incumbent groups or classes to prevent
incipient competitors from entering the market. Hence, the market,
whether it be political or economic, has an inherent tendency to be
monopolistic where one class or set of groups seeks to set the terms
for another.
As a product of an economically loaded political process, the
welfare state inevitably reflects the class tensions and economic
differences that underly the political arena.5 The welfare state in
large part serves the interests of those who are able to preserve
their advantages in the political arena-.
The notion of class differences is especially pronounced in
the relationship between providers and recipients of welfare state
capitalism, the relationship between people are inherently antago-
nistic rather than harmonious.
5 According to Marx, class conflict and antagonism are rooted
in the labor theory of value and in the social relations of produc-
tion. Marx observed that owners of capital appropriated to them-
selves a certain portion of the exchange value of the working
person's labor. He considered this exploitation by one class in
society of another class to be the basic source of social conflict.
Marx did not limit class struggle to owners and nonowners of capital.
He saw class conflict as a phenomenon that permeated all social
relationships, not merely those that center around the means of
production. The political economy paradigm sees class struggle as
extending to all groups who benefit disproportionately from the
system versus those groups who continue to lose. Although many
professionals and members of the intelligentsia are not owners of
capital they owe "...their position, prosperity, and superior
knowledge and education to privileges inherent in the capitalist
system" and therefore become apologists for that system.
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services -- a relationship that will receive considerable attention
in later sections of this article. It is usually the providers, not
the recipients who set the terms for the provision of health and
welfare services. Despite their altruism, providers generally come
from economically advantaged groups and are the main proponents
of welfare state services in the political process. They tend to
recommend intervention and service delivery strategies that are
consistent with their professional interests. Welfare state services
are often provided for the convenience of providers rather than
consumers. Class differences are also intrinsic to distinctions
such as doctor and patient, and social worker and client. Profession-
alism among welfare state providers has the latent function of
maintaining class differences. These observations should lead us
to wonder who the real beneficiaries of the welfare state are.
But class distinctions affect the welfare state in a more
fundamental way. The welfare state helps to sustain a low-wage,
marginal and sporadic labor force. Contrary to the protestations
of business about the high cost of the welfare state, it remains in
the interest of business to have a surplus population that can be
hired at substandard wages. Directly or indirectly, business
benefits from the existence of a welfare state that provides a wage
supplement and what Galper (1973:37) calls "a back-up 'fringe
benefit' program" for capitalism's residual labor force.
The welfare state is also an important instrument of social
control. By making an economically surplus population dependent on
its services, the welfare state is able to regulate and control
the lives of those it purports to serve. Even while championing
the cause of self-determination, service providers play a sinister
game of social control in the professional-client relationship. The
welfare state has also been used to stem the tide of social unrest.
Recall the domestic pacification programs of the 1960's when services
were rapidly expanded in the inner city after the so-called "ghetto
riots."
The concept of class conflict is essential if we are to come
to terms with problems such as income distribution, poverty, racism,
sexism, or many of the other problems we are confronted with. At
their root, each of these problems entail some form of exploitation
by one group or another. Once a group or class has obtained
advantages at the expense of another, it will seek to maintain those
advantages, even covertly, through the welfare state which allegedly
is designed to mitigate social disparities.
-I?-
Thus, contrary to the free market-pluralist conception, the state
is not a neutral party to the competition or a neutral regulator but
a partisan of class interests. The role of the welfare state is
not neutrality but one of stability in order to preserve the vested
interests of advantaged groups or classes. Social welfare programs
constitute but one instrument by which the state preserves the
hegemony of the dominant classes.
Coventional political theory has tried to demonstrate its
relevance to problems such as poverty and racial discrimination. The
solution implicit in pluralism was to get the poor and disenfranchised
into the arena -- hence, the passage of voting rights legislation,
the development of community action agencies and the creation of model
cities programs that were geared toward "maximum feasible participa-
tion." Although new groups were admitted to the political arena, they
did not bargain on an equal footing; the arena as we have said was
not economically neutral. The "screaming" and the "yelling" that at
times characterized the participation of these groups only spoke to
their powerlessness. They had no chips to cash in or favors to give out.
Academic economics has also tried to demonstrate its ability
to deal with problems such as poverty and discrimination by looking at
these problems as issues of inadequate human capital formation or as
distortions in the labor market where individual labor is paid less
than its marginal product. When looking at the problem of welfare
versus work, neoclassical economic theory treats the problem as a
special application of the income-leisure trade-off ignoring the
larger issue of the inability of our economic system to provide
sufficient work at an adequate wage.
In both political and economic theory, the analysis is reduced
from the macro-societal level to the micro-individual level. Implicit
in this reductionism is a view of social change. It places the
burden of change on the individual, not society. Even in interest
group theory, it is assumed that the deficiency rests with the
inability of individual group members to organize and participate.
Conventional political and economic analysts both ignore the fact
that powerful class interests have a vested interest in keeping certain
groups disorganized and dependent. It thus becomes easier to blame
the victim, not society.
Historicism and Social Consciousness
If class conflict has its origin in the economic order, it
should follow that ones perception of class intersts or ones class
-13-
consciousness also has a material basis. Said Marx, "It is not
the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but,
on the contrary, their social existence determines their conscious-
ness" (quoted in Hunt, 1972:36). For political economists, the
social and economic context is indispensible to understanding the
ideas and ideologies that sustain a particular ordering of social
reality.
Much of political economy's critique of the free market
ideology is based on the observation that the ideology arises from
a particular social and historical context. The free market concep-
tion of reality did not emerge out of a social and economic vacuum,
nor did it emerge out of some historical void. For Marx, both the
social and historical context were important as expressed in the
concept of historical materialism. It was from this perspective
that Marx developed his analysis of capitalism both as a social
system and as an ideology.
Conventional economics, for example, tends to be very ahistorical.
It examines economic and political phenomena independent of their
historical context. Most economists do not see the world as
changing. To quote Gorden (1965:124):
It is, I think, remarkable compared to the physical
sciences that an economist's fundamental way of
viewing the world has remained unchanged since the
18th century... it is a tribute to the supremacy of
purely positivistic intellectual forces that such
has been the case.
Moreover, neoclassists fail to see capitalism as only one form of
economic organization that arose in a particular historical period.
Many economists assume that some form of market economy has always
existed. As a result, the history of economic thought has
diminished as an important component of many American graduate
programs in economics.
This same disregard for history and social context has all too
often characterized the analysis of the welfare state. Like other
public policies, the welfare state has emerged from a particular
social economic context. The German welfare state started under
Bismark as an attempt to head off even larger demands for social
reform. In this country, the welfare state has gone through two
-14-
major periods of expansion: first in the 1930's and later in the
1960's.6 Both were periods of social unrest. As we shall see in
later sections of this paper, there have also been other important
forces that have shaped various sectors of the welfare state.
There is, however, one type of historical analysis that does
creep into many studies of the welfare state. It is one where the
welfare state is seen as the final form of social and political
organization. The welfare state according to this perception is
seen as the culmination of a long evolutionary process whereby raw
unadulterated capitalism is tamed and harnessed to serve important
social goals.7 This point of view affirms capitalism and fails to
see welfare state capitalism as only one form of social organization
emerging in a particular historical period. It is a culture-bound
interpretation of the welfare state.
Alienation and Labor
Implicit in the income-leisure trade-off model used by econo-
mists to determine the effects of welfare and taxes on work, is an
assumption that work is distasteful and lacks utility. Consequently,
individuals only engage in work to earn income that gives them
utility. It is true that much of work in modern society is dis-
tasteful. However, the distastefulness is not inherent in the work
but in the social organization of that work. A wage dependent labor
force sells its time for income upon which it can survive. Such a
work force will be alienated from the time it spends at work. Our
social system fails to see that work is more than a means of making
money. It is also indispensible to individual self-realization
and self-worth.
In a capitalist society, labor is merely another expense of
production much like raw materials and machinery. Labor is reduced
6 The expansion of the early 1970's must be seen as part of a
momentum that was begun in the 1960's.
7 This historical perspective can be seen in some of the essays
included in a compendium edited by Charles I. Schottland (1967). A
more conspicuous example is found in a work by Walter I. Trattner
(1974) entitled From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social
Welfare in America. The title of Trattner's book suggests an
evolutionary progression as well as a historical one.
to a commodity to be bought or sold like any other means of produc-
tion. Man becomes a means, not an end. Under these circumstances
people become alienated from their work. They no longer see work
as a creative extension of themselves. Capitalism, with its
emphasis on cost minimization and economies of scale, usually calls
for a high division of labor. The final product does not contain
the identity of the individual but the trademark of the organization.
The individual surrenders his or her identity to the organization.
S/he becomes identified by his or her organizational affiliation,
not by his or her worth as an individual human being.
Although an individual's loss of control and autonomy has its
origins in the capitalist wage system, it does not end at the work-
place. Alienation begins to characterize other social relationships
as well. Individuals feel powerless to determine the course of
their lives or to affect the social policies that shape the quality
of their lives. The ultimate degradation occurs when individuals
become alienated from themselves and reduce themselves to commodities
to be exchanged in the market. As Fromm (1967:129-130) put it:
His body, his mind and his soul are his capital, and his
task in life is to invest if favorably, to make a profit
of himself. Human qualities like friendliness, courtesy,
kindness, are transformed into commodities, into assests
of the "personality package," conducive to a higher
price on the personality market. If the individual
fails in making a profitable investment of himself, he
feels that he is a failure; if he succeeds, he is a
success. Clearly, his sense of his own value always
depends on factors extraneous to himself, on the fickle
judgement of the market, which decides about his value
as it decides about the values of commodities. He, like
all commodities that cannot be sold profitably on the
market, is worthless as far as his exchange value is
concerned, even though his use value may be considerable.
Thus, the market is not only the means by which goods and services
are exchanged, but also becomes the standard by which individuals
measure their own self-worth.
There is little in the arsenal of welfare state services to
combat the pervasive effects of alienation. In fact, the welfare
state is an accomplice to this social evil in two ways. First,
its services are directed at transforming individuals into
commodities (otherwise known as "rehabilitation") to be exchanged
in an impersonal market that channels them into low-level unfulfilling
types of employment. Second, its services are provided by large
impersonal bureaucracies that are in many ways the ultimate models
of routinization and alienation. As long as the welfare state
remains primarily cocmited to the maintenance of the private market
and the supremacy of the profit criterion, it does not stand a
reasonable chance of correcting problems that result from the
alienation inherent in the capitalist system.
Comnunitarianism and the Individual
Capitalism not only undermines the individual, but also the
community upon which the individual depends for much of his or her
well-being. Community ties are considered inefficient in a capitalist
market system. Capitalism requires a mobile population that is
ready to move from job to job and place to place. Family and
community loyalties are seen as barriers to the free movement of
labor. From this perspective, welfare state policies serve
two ends. First, they are instituted to provide certain social
protections -- such as income support and social services -- that
were once provided by extended families, religious parishes, or
other community networks. Second, they are designed to facilitate
the mobility of the work force. In this sense the welfare state
is an indispensible chamber maid serving with dustpan and broom to
clean up the mess made by the capitalist market system.
We are remiss, therefore, to look at the problems of the welfare
state solely in terms of their programnatic deficiencies. Instead,
we must focus our attention on the economic system that has
generated the problems for the welfare state to solve. The welfare
state is, however, fair game to the extent to which it incorporates
the values of the economic system and thus perpetuates the problems
created by capitalism.
Liberal apologists see the welfare state as a "cushion to the
shocks of industrialism" (Frankel, 1967:208), that come as an
inevitable and necessary by-product of economic development.
According to Frankel (1967:208), a "growing and innovating indus-
trial society cannot be composed of individuals so dependent on
family and local associations that movement will cut them loose
from all their social moorings." Implicit in this observation is
a subtle assumption that economic and community development are
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somehow mutually exclusive.8 They are not. The error in liberal
reasoning is to mistake the necessities of industrialism for the
consequences of capitalism. There is nothing in industrial develop-
ment per se that is inherently incompatible with community develop-
ment. There is something, however, in capitalism, as a special form
of industrial development, that is inherently incompatible with
community development.
Capitalism and its free market ideology have no conception of
community. It does, however, have a very limited and narrow con-
ception of society. Society is seen as a mere collection of auto-
nomous individuals, each seeking his or her own interests. Social
well-being is defined in terms of the individual: it is, as we
observed earlier, merely the sum of each individual's utility
function. Society is reduced to an aggregate social welfare function.
It is nothing more than an aggregation of individuals getting as
much as they can for themselves.
A rejection of individualism is not a rejection of individuality.
The well-being of the individual is inseparable from the well-being
of the community at large. The community has definition and
integrity of its own; it is not merely a collection of individuals.
The community is an environment that nurtures individual development.
Communitarianism, as one might call it, is not a demand for
excessive conformity as some fear, but is an invitation for mutual
support. By contrast, capitalism and competition are often destruc-
tive of important human values.
If we achieve our successes in a competitive relationship
with others, we will need to be on guard against them
for fear that they'll try to take our gains from us...
We will necessarily assume a guarded and uncomplimentary
view of others that is destructive to the achieve-
ment of important human values, namely community, human
warmth, and social integration (Galper, 1975:37).
81 am reluctant to ascribe this assumption personally to
Frankel. Although a defender of the welfare state, his defense is
a qualified one. Nor is Frankel totally unaware of the welfare
state's origins in capitalism. However, his description is typical
of those used by many other liberals. Because his choice of words
was particularly good, I elected to quote him here.
-i8-
In short, capitalism, with its emphasis on competition and
individualism, fosters ill-will that is destructive of societal and
individual well-being. Community and mutual trust promote both
societal and individual development.
In the next two sections, we will apply the framework we have
developed to two different sectors of the welfare state: (1) Medicare
and the health care industry, and (2) social services under the
Social Security Act. The limits of space require that we be
selective, but I believe that these two examples should help to
demonstrate the utility of political economy as a tool of policy
analysis. Moreover, I will try to show how free market assumptions
tend to confuse issues and thus often lead to inappropriate, if not
false, policy conclusions.
IV
MEDICARE AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
At the time of its passage in 1965, Medicare was considered a
triumph of the liberal establishment. It represented the culmination
of a 30-year struggle to implement some form of social security-
based financing for health care. The struggle was often a bitter
one that demonstrated the power of the health care industry to dictate
the terms of the debate.
The use of the word "struggle" suggests the presence of a strong
ideological component in the Medicare debate. Medicare was perceived
to be a "redistributive" policy "which reallocates benefits and burdens
among socioeconomic groups" (Marmor, 1970:107ff). Redistributive
policy debates tend to polarize groups in fairly-well identified
ideological camps and tend to attract groups that have only a marginal
interest in the outcome of the debate. For example, the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, which had only a peripheral interest in national health
care policy, eagerly joined forces with other members of its ideo-
logical fraternity, such as the American Medical Association, and
others who fought the adoption of Medicare. To use Lowi's (1964:
701-711) terms, redistributive issues tend to separate "money-providing"
and "service-demanding" groups along fairly well-defined class and
ideological lines and thus take on a moral and symbolic significance
that arouses groups that have only indirect vested interests.
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Most academicians who have analyzed the Medicare debate tend
to focus on the conservative-liberal dichotomy that pitted the
health care industry and its allies against organized labor, the
aged, and administration spokesmen. Analysts tend to concentrate
on issues such as the degree to which government should intervene
in the private health care market; the extent to which federal
rather than state government should be responsible for the financing
of health services; the degree to which public welfare or social
insurance methods of financing should be used; and the range of
benefits to be included. Moreover, great attention is also given
to the strategies used by various actors in the debate. Though
these issues are not trivial, emphasis on them tends to produce an
analysis which presumes a set of values and assumptions common to
both proponents and opponents of Medicare. This in turn narrows
the range of alternatives considered "relevant" to the policy debate.
Because the same concerns are present in the current national
health insurance debate, a reevaluation of the Medicare debate from
a political economy perspective is most relevant and instructive
in understanding some of the health care policy issues confronting
us today.
As in other social policy issues, the common denominator
between liberals and conservatives in the Medicare debate was their
fundamental commitment to the capitalist market system. At no
time during the course of the debate did Medicare's proponents
suggest that government be the ultimate provider of medical care,
as in a national health service. The purpose of Medicare was to
provide financial access to a market comprised of private health
care providers.
Drawing Up the Sides
The main differences between advocates and opponents of Medicare
was the extent to which government should intervene in the private
medical care market. Opponents of Medicare had almost unlimited
faith in the private market to automatically adjust to new needs
and new demands. The market was prepared to meet the demands of
the sovereign consumer. The large number of uninsured aged did
not pose a fundamental threat to this ideology of the free market.
The opponents of Medicare took comfort in the fact that increasing
numbers of America's aged were obtaining private health insurance.
This trend confirmed the basic soundness of the market; the market
was adjusting. It was only a matter of time. Under a self-
corrective system, governmental intervention would have only negative
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effects. (The post-Medicare rise in medical costs has been used as
a vindication of this argument.) Government would only distort the
"true" preferences of the consumer and blunt the initiatives of
health care providers.
Opponents willingly admitted that there were some who could not
participate in the open market. However, the reason for this failure
did not reside in any shortcoming of the market, but in the inade-
quacies of the individual. For those unable to acquire needed
services through the market, there was always the beneficience of the
provider, i.e., charity medicine.
Other opponents of Medicare stretched this rather restrictive
free market perspective to argue that government does have a residual
role: it should subsidize the cost of care for those without the
requisite means to participate in the open market. Even this less
restrictive point of view accepted the inadequacy of the individual
rather than the shortcomings of the market as the basis for failure.
These opponents of Medicare supported a residual welfare approach
to the financing of health care as expressed in the Kerr-Mills and
Medicaid legislation. They merely substituted the public paternalism
of welfare medicine for the private paternalism of charity medicine.
But their creed remained the same: the government that governs least
governs best.
The protagonists in the struggle had a somewhat different per-
ception of the role of government. They espoused the liberal notion
that government was needed to correct a market that was not meeting
the needs of the entire population. Organized labor and the aged
looked to government to guarantee health benefits that were efficiently
but unevenly distributed through the private sector. Throughout the
Congressional hearings, one could hear the refrain "We have the best
system of medical care in the world, but some cannot afford it."
This assumed that the problem was on the consumer side of the market,
not the provider side. By changing the demand side of the equation,
Medicare supporters hoped to correct whatever imbalances existed.
Private Entrepremeurial Medicine Reinforced
Medicare in its final form represented an amalgam of these
different views. Government would guarantee the payment of medical
services acquired by social security beneficiaries, but would not
interfere in the delivery of physician or hospital services. In short,
Medicare became a publicly-financed system of medical care provided
by private practitioners who were still allowed to make their profit.
-21-
Payments would be made through traditional financial intermediaries.
The freedom of choice in a "pluralist" health system would remain
undisturbed.
With Medicare, the capitalist system of American medical care
was not only preserved but reinforced. Physicians and hospitals
received what some would call a blank check. Physicians were
guaranteed full payment at "usual and customary" rates and hospitals
were guaranteed full reimbursement. The health insurance industry
was preserved and emulated. The insurance industry was relieved of
the most difficult and burdensome problems involved in insuring
the aged. Instead, the insurance industry acquired government as
its patron by obtaining the statutory right to function as the finan-
cial intermediaries for hospital costs under Part A, and as the
insurance carriers for supplementary medical service costs under
Part B. Few utilization controls or quality controls were placed
on providers. Rather, the burden of controls was placed on the
consumer in the form of certain exclusions and in the form of deduc-
tibles and co-payments.
How is it that instead of destroying private entrepreneurial
medicine, Medicare actually strengthened the capitalist system of
American medical care? What does this outcome and other features
of the Medicare legislation tell us about the validity of the free
market-pluralist construction of reality? What explanations does
political economy have to offer? How do the outcomes of the Medicare
legislation demonstrate the ability of the free market ideology to
support class interests? What purposes or functions does the free
market ideology serve?
The most important function of the free market ideology is that
it diverts attention from the health care provider. It effectively
removes the burden of change from the health care system, thereby
leaving the distribution of economic and political power within
the health care system undisturbed. Thus, the free market ideology
serves the class interests of the health care provider. To under-
stand how the free market ideology is able to deflect attention away
from the health care system, a careful analysis of free market
concepts and assumptions is required.
Consumer Sovereignty
One fundamental concept in free market thinking is the doctrine
of consumer sovereignty. This concept asserts that it is the
consumer who ultimately determines what goods and services are
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provided in a free market system. Intended or not, consumer sovereignty
was one of the key premises of the Medicare legislation. Given the
shortcomings of the private health market, all the solutions were
directed to the consumers of health care, not the providers. The
problem was financing, not structural change. There was an unchallenged
assumption that by changing the demand side of the equation, that
changes in the supply side would be automatic. Like their adversaries,
the proponents of Medicare were seduced by the mysterious gyrations
of the hidden hand.
However, in the health care market, unlike many others, the
provider, not the consumer, is sovereign. It is the physician, not
the patient, who prescribes the drugs, orders the X-rays and lab
tests, arranges the surgery, and discharges the patient from the hos-
pital. The doctrine of consumer choice serves a very useful purpose
in that it shifts the burden from the provider to the consumer. It
is interesting to observe that the utilization controls provided by
the Medicare legislation were not placed on the physician (that would
be interfering in the practice of medicine), but on the consumer in
the form of deductibles and coinsurance. The sovereignty of the
physician went unchallenged.
Perfect Competition & Pluralism
In an earlier section of this article, we observed that perfect
competition is the most rigid interpretation of the free market ideology
where the following conditions obtain: rational self-interest, perfect
knowledge, open access, smallness, etc. We also noted how perfect
competition has its political analogue in the concept of democratic
pluralism. These same concepts are often used by health industry
apologists to describe the character of their industry.
According to the pluralist concept, there is in the
distribution of economic and political power an effective
balance of different participating forces -- the
medical profession, the hospitals, the trade unions, the
private agencies, etc. -- which represent the pluarlity
of interests that compete within the system. These
forces operate under the watchful eye of the democratic
state, and achieve, as a result of competition, a rough
equilibrium in which everybody has power and no one
has, or can have, too much of it (Navarro, 1973:230-31).
But to describe the health sector as perfectly competitive and
pluralist is inaccurate: The health industry violates nearly all the
assumptions of perfect competition and pluralism, especially those of
perfect knowledge, open access, and smallness. Knowledge is unionized
and is considered the sole domain of the physician. Entry into the
market is controlled by the medical profession through its control
over medical training, licensure, and specialty certification. The
assumption of smallness is also false, although the concept of solo
practice obscures this basic reality. Solo practitioners are part of
a larger network of providers whose respective domains in the health
industry are quite interdependent. The solo practitioner usually has
hospital privileges and access to other services that make him an
integral part of a larger establishment whose well-being is closely
connected with his own professional and economic interests. The basic
values of private entrepreneurial medicine are supported and reinforced
by the high priests of university-based medicine who control medical
teaching institutions, the foundations, and much of government-
sponsored medical research. The interests of the various sectors of
the medical establishment are virtually inseparable. These overlapping
sectors exhibit a pattern of behavior that is more monopolistic than
competitive. The monopolistic character of the medical establishment
enables it not only to determine who shall enter the market and the
type of practice, but also the system of payment, the type of organi-
zation, and the overall price of care that will prevail in the health
industry. The various sectors of the health industry may from time
to time disagree among themselves, but their connon interests are
sufficiently strong to effectively set the terms of the health care
debate, especially when their political adversaries share many of the
same assumptions.
Sunary
Thus, the Medicare legislation demonstrates the ability of the
free market ideology to obscure the real nature of the health care
industry. But as we have seen, the political economy critique goes
further. Not only does it hit at the basic invalidity of the free
market conception, but asks what class or special interests benefit
from this conception. By focusing on the underlying distribution of
economic and political power in the health care market, as we have
here, political economy offers an explanation for the outcomes of
the Medicare legislation that cannot be developed within the pluralist
framework. Because it assumes that the political arena is neutral,
the pluralist framework tends to overlook these economic and political
disparities and how these imbalances are reflected in policy outcomes.
Moreover, political economy challenges the pluralist theory that
government is a neutral umpire in the on-going competition between
consumer and provider interests. It also undermines the revisionist
theory that the welfare state exists as a countervailing force to
-24-
the power of the private market. The political economy critique suggests
that Medicare has helped to make the welfare state an ally of the
capitalist health care system, if not its captive.
Application to the National Health Insurance Debate
Almost all of the same issues that surfaced in the Medicare
debate have re-emerged in the national health insurance debate of the
last several years. Some two dozen national health insurance proposals
have been introduced in the 94th Congress. Still the ideology of the
free market continues to dominate and set the limits of the debate.
None of the bills under serious consideration proposes a national
health service or an alternative that deviates markedly from the
market approach. Only the Kennedy-Corman Health Security Plan more
directly confronts the dynamics of the existing health market, but
the plan is considered by many to be too far removed from the mainstream
of current thinking to survive serious compromise.
We have observed the symbiotic nature of the relationship
between ideology and social structure. The mutual dependence of free
market ideology and private entrepeneurial medicine appears to be as
strong today as it was a decade ago when Medicare was enacted into law.
Moreover, the ideology of the free market continues to obscure
economic and social reality as it did in the Medicare debate. Today,
defenders of the present system merely substitute the word "pluralism"
("our pluralistic health system") for the words "private medicine,"
giving the present arrangement a ring of legitimacy that even appeals
to the system's critics. Pluralism has become the new code word for
leaving matters as they are. Pluralism in the health industry is a
fiction. It speaks to a diversity that does not exist. A political
economy critique is desparately needed if we are to penetrate and go
beyond the rhetorical flourishes of the free market-pluralist ideology
that dominates the current national health insurance debate. Unless
a more radical assessment is forthcoming, we are likely only to shore
up the present health care system, with all its inequities and
disparities intact.
V
SOCIAL SERVICES UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
The Social Security Act authorizes funding for a large number
of social service programs that are intended to help welfare recipients
and other groups become or remain economically self-sufficient. These
programs include day care, family counseling, work training, adult
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foster care, home help services, educational services, family planning
services, child welfare services and many others. Funds for these
services are usually funneled from the federal government to state
public welfare departments, who in turn administer these services as
a complement to their income maintenance and medical assistance
(Medicaid) activities. State public welfare departments have the
option of also acting as financial intermediaries by having these
services administered on a contractual or on a "purchase-of-service"
basis with private social welfare agencies or other state agencies.
In December 1974, Congress passed H.R. 17045, otherwise known
as Title XX of the Social Security Act. The creation of Title XX was,
in part, an attempt to consolidate the various service programs that
previously were rendered under other titles of the same act. It also
represented the culmination of a concerted effort on the part of the
social welfare establishment to reduce federal administrative discretion
that had proven to be hostile to the rapid growth of social service
expenditures. 9 Since Title XX is the statutory basis for many social
service programs, we shall often use the terms "Title XX" and "social
services" interchangeably.
Our purpose here is to demonstrate how the ideologies of
individualism and the free market come to expression in the social
services field. The social services area is loaded down with shibboleths
that tend to obscure its real ideological and class commitments.
Underneath all the rhetoric of "helping others," "self-determination,"
and "self-sufficiency" are fundamental class antagonisms that
compromise the effectiveness of social service programs. Moreover,
it is my contention that the social services constitutes an industry
with specific economic and political behaviors often overlooked by
conventional economists and mainline pluralists.
Commitment to Individualism and Free Market Values
The social service provisions of the Social Security Act have
always been sold to the Congress and the public as a means of "helping
people get off welfare." Despite the utter failure of social service
programs to actually do so, social services continue to be seen as an
alternative to the dependency fostered by public assistance programs.
9A more complete discussion on the struggle between the federal
government and the remainder of the social welfare establishment will
be presented in a later portion of this section.
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Social services are intended to impart the necessary motivation and
skills that will induce individuals to leave welfare' and become self-
sufficient by participating in the private market. Thus, the social
services becomes one of the ways in which society inculcates individualism
and free market values to certain social classes.
Few can argue against self-reliance, but self-reliance is usually
defined in a narrow way that is ultimately destructive of important
human values. Social service intervention strategies assume that a
person is, or should be selfish, acquisitive, and competitive. Such
behaviors are seen as the means by which individuals can achieve success,
material well-being, and happiness. Those individuals who do not
exhibit such behaviors are singled out as problematic and as "unmotivated"
and in need of social services. Unselfish and nonagressive behaviors
are often considered deviant. Thus its altruistic rhetoric notwith-
standing, the social services industry fosters attitudes and behaviors
that are consonant with capitalistic free enterprise values, but are
often inconsistent with values that are necessary to human and social
well-being.
Commitment to the Perpetuation of Class Antagonisms
Intended or not, social services also exploits interclass and
intraclass antagonisms. Social services are seen as an investment in
human capital that will enable individuals "to get ahead." But social
service programs fail to ask a more fundamental question: "Get ahead
of whom?" Thus the social services enable welfare recipients to
compete with each other for the few menial jobs that are available.
Even when the private economy is expansive, the simple fact of the
matter is that there are too few jobs at the lower end of the employment
market. The placement of social service recipients often can only
be accomplished at the expense of displacing an equally qualified person
whose economic status is also marginal. Simply stated, there is "no
room at the bottom." Hence, the social services strategy permits the
other classes to retain their social and economic prerogatives. Social
services are a nonthreatening approach to the amelioration of social
problems. It is a strategy that removes the burden of change from
those who are most equipped to those who are least able to redress
social disparities.
Those few who are able to get ahead often do so at the risk of
accepting the values and commitments of the social stratum to which
they aspire. One class is thus able to co-opt members of another leaving
the existing social structure only marginally changed, if at all.
Inequities tend to be reinforced, not ameliorated.
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There is another, more fundamental, class antagonism -- the
conflict between service professionals and their clients. The pro-
fessional-client relationship is predicated on a basic inequality
between the two people involved. The quest for professionalism among
social service workers can only be obtained at the expense of deepening
this inequality. At the heart of professionalism is an attempt to
maintain or extend vested interests. The purpose of professionalism
is to preserve class privilege. Professionalization institutionalizes
values and assumptions that are conducive to the maintenance of class
differences. Ironic though it may be, social service professionals
support the very class antagonisms that are endemic to the problems
they seek to solve.
The exigencies of today's labor market for social service pro-
fessionals makes the maintenance of class differences even more critical
to the worker-client relationship. A tight labor market makes social
service professionals acutely aware of how tenuous their position in
society really is. They begin to realize that the distance between
worker and client is not as great as first believed -- a realization
that can be threatening to the sense of self-worth of the professional.
Such a threat unveils the extent to which class distinctions are critical
to the maintenance of professional self-worth. Instead of seeing that
the worker and the client share a common predicament with common social
and ideological origins, the social service professional works even
harder to maintain his/her status in society and, in so doing, helps
to undermine the self-actualizing potential of the clientele s/he serves.
Client dependency is an inevitable outcome of services rendered by a
profession that is, one way or another, committed to the maintenance
of class differences. And a constricting labor market that exacerbates
professional insecurities provides additional incentives for client
dependency.
One characteristic of a profession is its determination to find
new domains in which it can establish itself as a legitimate authority.
During periods of retrenchment and shrinking labor markets, there is
an additional incentive to carve out new domains that yield new clientele.
This pressure is evident in the Title XX legislation in two ways. First,
Title XX requires each state to engage in a comprehensive "needs
assessment" -- a method by which the social service establishment can
justify their existence and expansion. Second, Title XX allows each
state to provide services to individuals and families with incomes up
to 115 per cent of the state's median family income. Prior to Title XX,
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service dollars were more narrowly focused on welfare recipients.
1 0
By extending its population base, social service workers are able
to preserve their professional status, not to mention the increasing
professional prestige that allegedly accrues when serving a more middle
class clientele. Thus, even within the ranks of the social service
professions are class distinctions based on the types of clientele that
are served.)1 In this manner, social service professionals have
accepted the larger society's definition of class differentials as the
basis for their own rankings. By incorporating society's class antago-
nisms into their own professions, social service workers become the
carriers of the disease, the symptoms of which they seek to ameliorate.
Another threat to the professional security of social service
workers is the growth of "paraprofessionals" whose ranks are often made
up of former welfare recipients. During periods of nearly unlimited
demand for professional social service personnel, professionals strongly
advocated the development of subprofessional level staff, mainly to
alleviate them of work considered undignified for professionals. This
attitude was reflected in the separation of income maintenance and
10 Prior to 'the introduction of Title XX, HEW regulations (May 1973
regulations) required that services be restricted to those who were wel-
fare recipients in the previous three months or those who were likely to
become recipients in the coming six months, but whose income did not
exceed 150 percent of the state's cash assistance standard. These regu-
lations implemented the $2.5 billion ceiling on federal social service
expenditures as authorized by the Revenue Sharing Act of 1972. The Act
contained a requirement that at least 90 percent of social service
expenditures be spent on applicants for, or recipients of, public
assistance. A few exceptions to this requirement were allowed.
11
child welfare, because it has a more middle class distribution of
clientele, has always been considered a more prestigious area of endeavor
than providing services to public assistance recipients. Elitism of
this nature continues to be a chronic problem in some quarters of the
social services industry. In state government, for example, there has
been constant pressure to establish separate departments for children
despite all the rhetoric about integrated services. Although there may
be sound public policy reasons to establish separate youth-oriented
departments, professional elitism continues to be strong undercurrent
in such issues.
-29-
social service programs several years ago. Separation allegedly would
remove the burdensome paperwork of eligibility determination and allow
professional social service workers to do the "real" work of client
rehabilitation that was more in keeping with their professional image.
Separation and other policy changes have helped to swell the ranks of
subprofessionals and now, ironically, threatens the very professional
image they were intended to sustain. The growth of subprofessionals
has helped to break down the myth that only social service professionals
possessed a unique body of skills needed for client rehabilitation.
In short, the growth of subprofessional level workers creates additional
pressures for the maintenance of class differences.
The ahistorical character of social science research and thinking
has also penetrated the schooling of social service professionals. All
too many social service workers have forgotten or never learned of
their professional origins in the friendly visitor of the Charity
Organization Movement (COM) of the latter half of the 19th century.
The COM often reeked with class prejudice and maternalism. According
to the COM philosophy, the poor were wayward children whose condition
was due to certain inbred character deficiencies. All the poor really
needed was sympathy, tact, patience, and wise counsel. The role of the
friendly visitor was to provide the necessary wisdom, friendship, and
above all, the moral uplift that was needed to bring people out of
their destitution. The friendly visitor was usually some upper crust
matron who had few socially legitimate outlets for her time. The COM
philosophy found a smug basis in social Darwinism, which provided an
intellectual justification for social inequality and the theory that
poverty was caused by personal frailty. The COM believed that friendly
visiting and not almsgiving would cure the sloth and immorality of
the lower class. As recently as the early 1960's, the social service
establishment in support of the 1962 service amendments (of the Social
Security Act) argued that what the poor needed was rehabilitation in
order to leave public assistance -- a small historical footnote to
indicate that class consciousness has been very much at the cutting
edge of social service philosophy. The language of the friendly visitor
era may appear crass by our standards today, but the jargon of rehabili-
tation and self-determination is merely one attempt to give underlying
class antagonism professional legitimacy.
Commitment to a Mixed Public-Private Social Services Industry
Prior to the adoption of the service amendments in the 1960's, most
social service activity took place in the private domain. Many private
social service agencies had their beginnings in the COM near the turn
of the century when American capitalism was at its unbridled peak.
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They were often the creation of some wealthy benefactor who wished to
be known for his generosity to the lower classes. Private agencies
were often funded on a haphazard basis, reflecting the whims and pet
social intervention theories of their wealthy sponsors. After World
War I, as the competition for private funding intensified, federated
fund-raising organizations, such as the Community Chests, were
established. Federated funding was also an attempt to bring greater
uniformity to the administration of private social welfare services.
However, federated funding has never been a sufficient source of
financing for private agencies which responded to their own organiza-
tional imperatives to solve new problems and find new clients. As its
financial base proved insufficient, the private sector looked to public
funding. In many parts of the country, private child welfare agencies,
for example, have had a long tradition of being funded in part by
juvenile courts for services provided to wards of the court. The
various service amendments to the Social Security Act represented a
quantum leap in the public financing of all social services. The
result has been the creation of large multibillion dollar public-
private industry.
Generally speaking, private agencies have engaged in two types
of public financing: (1) reimbursement -- where a public agency will
reimburse private agencies on a case-by-case basis, and (2) contracting --
where public agencies will contract with a private agency on a lump-sum
basis. In the second instance, private agencies have the potential to
expand their base of operation four-fold. Under Title XX, the federal
government is prepared to match, under certain conditions, each private
agency dollar with three federal dollars. 12 Private agency growth
potential is, of course, limited by federal and state regulations and
by the total number of federal dollars available to any one state.
Analogy to the Military Industrial Complex
My choice of the word "industry" to describe this public-private
consortium is a deliberate one. The market characteristics of this
industry in many ways resemble the behaviors of the so-called military-
industrial complex. Most social welfare professionals would not
appreciate this analogy with the armed services industry, since they
do not wish to think of themselves as mercenary as the munitions and
12 The special conditions are set forth in 45 CFR Sec. 288.54.
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arms manufacturers are thought to be. But because their livelihood is
so dependent on the public till, private agencies and their industry
leaders often engage in economic and political behaviors not altogether
different from that found in the military-industrial complex. More-
over, as in the armed services industry, the social services industry
is marked by a high degree of inbreeding of personnel between the
public and private sectors. Although there may appear to be a fair
amount of antagonisms between the public and private sectors, both
sectors usually present a united front when marching to the public trough.
Economic Assumptions of the Social Services Industry
Conventional economists have pretty much ignored the social services
industry, in part because it does not conform to the neat and rigidly
defined models of competition, oligopoly, etc., even though various
components of the industry do have such market characteristics. Neo-
classical economics in particular has a way of either (1) excluding
important economic phenomena that cannot be understood within its
analytic framework, or (2) cramming economic reality into models that
provide a distorted analysis. Economists appear less able to cope
with this type of mixed public-private economy mainly because of the
large political component that cannot always be reduced to an arithmetic
production function or a demand curve. Hence, a critical perspective
that makes the political component explicit and a point of view that
is sensitive to its economic underpinnings is needed if we are to
understand the complex network of programs that we call the social
services industry. Political economy is especially qualified to provide
that critical perspective.
In applying the political economy critique to social services as
an industry, we must begin by examining the validity of the assumptions
that have shaped public policy toward the social services industry.
The purchase-of-service philosophy is based on two unexamined assumptions:
(1) that the private sector (market) can do it better, and (2) that an
element of consumer choice and competition exists when public agencies
purchase services from several private agencies. In most instances,
neither assumption is valid.
The notion that the private sector can do it better is a persistent
one in public policy formulation. Private social welfare has been
strongly influenced by the ideological persuasions of its capitalist
benefactors. However valid this notion may be in some sectors of the
American economy, it is utterly false in many quarters of the social
services industry. The very need for public funding often demonstrates
the inability of the private sector to do its job. Public dollars
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have often been used to shore up the "private" sector and in so doing
have preserved many of its structural weaknesses. Inefficient private
organizations have thus been subsidized -- a practice not altogether
different from bailing out Lockheed!
The concepts of consumer choice and competition are also largely
false. In some areas, markets are too small to support more than one
social service provider of a kind. Even when several providers are
available, it is the referring agency, and not the consumer, who makes
the choice. In many cases, the consumer is too dependent to make
informed choices. An eight-year old ward of the court is hardly in a
position to determine what child welfare facility is most appropriate
and a physically handicapped adult is not in the best position to
shop around for the best adult foster care facility. Moreover, the
important decisions about how long a client should be seen or how long
a client should be kept at a residential care facility is often left
to the provider, not to the client or the supervisory public agency.
Institutional Care & Social Control
The most expensive sector within the social services industry is
private institutional care. Institutional services are intended to
assist dependent children and adults who require intensive supervision
and care outside of their own home. Institutional care services are
usually purchased on a reimbursement basis where per diem charges are
assigned according to a negotiated cost formula. This reimbursement
procedure is loaded with economic incentives that create serious
distortions in the placement market and foster client dependency. Since
reimbursement policies are established according to per diem costs,
private institutional care agencies have an incentive to keep their beds
full in order to cover overhead and other fixed costs. Serious supply
shortages often result, forcing public agencies to purchase care on
a beds-available basis, not on a client-need basis. Hence, the
determination to guarantee a constant flow of income creates a powerful
economic incentive for private agencies to retain their clientele and
to maintain a measure of client dependency. The same incentives are
evident in the health care industry, where hospitals and nursing homes
retain patients to guarantee income. Whether it be health or social
services, the same basic law applies: utilization rises to meet capacity.
Even more sinister are some of the complex inter-account billings
that result in cross-subsidization and other market distortions. These
financial mechanisms usually work in the direction of underpricing
expensive out-of-home institutional care and overpricing cheaper in-
home care. These market features create incentives to move people
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into situations that are more intensive than really needed.
1 3
Pricing policies in the social services industry serve important
social control functions as well. Since most social services clientele
are drawn from the lower classes and since most decision makers identify
with more powerful interests, the pricing policies of the social services
industry also provide an economic justification for one element in
society to set the terms of societal participation for another.
The Staying Power of the Social Services Industry
Immense political pressure can be applied in forcing public
purchasing agencies to keep private institutions economically viable.
Public agencies often have the power of licensing to exercise control
over the private sector but most public agencies are reluctant to
enforce the sanctions inherent in that power. To explain this phenomenon,
we need to recall our analogy to the military-industrial complex. By
spreading its installations and contracts among numerous congressional
districts, the armed forces are able to call upon a powerful political
constituency when its pet projects are challenged. Private agencies
are similarly dispersed. When challenged by state authorities, they
are often able to call upon their respective representatives to apply
the necessary countervailing pressures. Equally powerful is the
ability of private agencies to disguise their economic interests in the
bleeding heart rhetoric that often accompanies the promotion of child
welfare servies or the concerns of old age.
What might, or what does, a pluralist conception of this industry
look like? A pluralist would probably see a series of countervailing
forces in the services market -- clients, private agencies, financial
intermediaries, and others -- none of whom could dictate the outcome
of the bargaining process. The pluralist conception has often been
incorporated in rate setting commissions and various advisory committees
customarily made up of representatives from sectors listed above.
Although the pluralist conception may describe much of the activity
that takes place inside the designated arena, the arena is often short-
circuited by private power. In many states, private providers have
1 3For example, one midwestern state had a policy of charging
county juvenile courts for the cost of maintaining a delinquent youth
in state-operated institutions. In determining a per diem rate, the
state would consider the cost of all types of residential care --
training schools, foster homes, group homes, etc. In order to keep the
training schools reasonably full, the state would establish a per diem
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organized into groups, attend political fund raisers, and cultivate
the good graces of legislative leaders in a manner that resembles the
lobbying efforts of our well-worn analogy, the military suppliers. Also,
private agencies are often represented by the rich and the powerful
under whose philanthropic beneficence private agencies are governed.
Private agency boards of directors share many of the same class interests
that characterize legislative leaders. Its alliance with special class
and economic interests allows private agencies to appeal their cause
in arenas where others are not always represented.
Our description suggests that private providers are able to set
the terms because of their superior position in the competition. Accurate
as this may be, it can also be misleading. There are issues around
which the various parties -- client groups, private providers, and
state authorities -- will present a united front. The Nixon Administra-
tion's attempt to curb the growth of social service expenditures offers
a good example. A large expansion of social services took place
beginning with the release of the 1969 social service regulations that
were designed to implement the 1967 amendments. Much of the expansion
was due to a liberalized matching policy that allowed new groups to be
served and that enabled private agencies to expand their programs.
In 1971, the Nixon Administration attempted to put a clamp on this
expansion and succeeded in placing a $2.5 billion ceiling on social
service outlays with an amendment to the Revenue Sharing Act of 1972.14
When HEW first issued new regulations to implement the new expenditure
ceiling, it cut at the heart of the public-private agency nexus by
excluding certain services and by disallowing private donated funds as
a source of local matching. A large cry went up to Washington from
all sectors of the industry who saw the regulations as an assault on
their economic and organizational well-being. HEW received some 208,515
comments during and after the formal 30-day comment period, not to
mention the pressures applied to individual members of Congress.
rate considerably below cost for training schools and a per diem rate
considerably above cost for community-type facilities, in effect under-
pricing institutional care. All of this was accomplished through little-
known and difficult-to-understand interaccount billing procedures.
14 Otherwise known as the State and Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972,
P.L. 92-512.
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(U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, & Welfare, 1973). The Congress
was forced to intercede and acted to rescind the introduction of the
new regulations. After considerable debate, Title XX was spawned to
permit the kind of state discretion that would preserve the interests
of providers and others, albeit in the name of the New Federalism.
This episode illustrates how deeply vested the interests of the
social services industry have become. It also suggests that future
federal social service policy will increasingly be dictated by the
needs of providers than by the needs of clients they purport to serve.
Especially during periods of retrenchment, the first priority will be
the preservation of the industry itself. Building, staff, equipment,
etc. are considered fixed inputs; clients are variable inputs in the
production of human services. When money becomes scarce, you try to
cover your fixed costs and scrimp on the variable costs. It is when
retrenchment begins to hit fixed costs that the cries of alarm increase
several-fold. It is my conviction that during the cycles of social
service expansion and contraction -- although the long-run curve is
one of expansion -- that during periods of expansion, it is the
provider who gains the most and that, during periods of contraction,
it is the client who loses the most.
The Persistence of Failure
An increasing body of evidence continues to show that social
services have failed to solve the problems they have selected as their
domain for intervention (Rossi, 1969:225). Sometimes problems are
ameliorated, but in most instances, there is no discernible change and,
in some instances, the change is for the worse. Despite the overwhelming
record of failure, the social services establishment attempts to explain
away failure in terms of inadequate budgets and staff. The social
services industry seems to have an endless ability to call upon new fads
and treatment theories that require new outlays of budget and staff,
each promising a panacea that does not materialize.
Political economy rejects the industry's own analysis of failure.
Our analysis here suggests two basic reasons for failure in the services
industry. First, social services support the very values and insti-
tutions that cause the social problems they are intended to ameliorate.
Their commitment to individualism and capitalist market values ultimately
undermine the very values that are necessary to human and community
well-being. Second, the professional and economic interests of social
providers result in serious goal displacement: client-oriented goals
become secondary to the organizational and professional maintenance
functions of social service providers. Much of this displacement has
its roots in the maintenance of class antagonisms. Contrary to liberal
-36-
ideology, the interests of clients and the social services state are
not always harmonious. Harmony is an illusion created by providers
and professionals who purport to speak for the interests of the
socially disenfranchised. Thus, as long as social services are adminis-
tered on terms established by provider interests, there is little
likelihood that the social service programs will be able to successfully
impart the life-enriching values and services sought by its consumers.
VI
CONCLUSIONS & SOLUTIONS
Conclusions
This analysis should not be construed as an unqualified assault
on the welfare state and the private market. The welfare state does
contain "residues of communal tendencies toward mutual and collective
responsibility" (Gil, 1975:18). Moreover, the private market can
serve important social goals. Instead, our concern has been with the
values and assumptions of the free market-pluralist ideology that
sustains the present conception of the welfare state. An analysis of
the welfare state that does not penetrate these underlying values and
assumptions must resign itself to trivialization and a concern with
smalland marginal issues that characterizes much of present-day social
policy research.
The emphasis on values and assumptions is based on a belief that
they contain a self-fulfilling logic that must eventually reveal itself
in policy outcomes. The characteristics which the free market ideology
ascribes to an individual are especially self-fulfilling; i.e., indi-
viduals take on the characteristics that are assigned to them. If a
person is assumed to be selfish, s/he will in one way or another act
that way. Finally, unexamined free market assumptions such as consumer
sovereignty, perfect knowledge, and open access, etc., can lead to
erroneous and misguided policy prescriptions as we have observed in the
health and social service industries.
Political economy's concern with class conflict, social conscious-
ness, alienation, and the community offers us the opportunity to see
that the welfare state does not operate in a society that is always
harmonic and conducive to meeting human needs. A political economic
analysis suggests that a welfare state that incorporates the values of
a capitalist market system cannot remedy the serious inequalities and
other social problems created by an acquisitive and competitive society.
Moreover, the concept of class conflict in particular should help us
to understand that interest group politics is a zero-sum game where
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one socially disenfranchised group often gains only at the expense
of another without realizing their mutual interest and common predica-
ment.
Solutions
Does political economy offer us a prescription for the problems
of the American welfare state? Yes it does. Unfortunately, the
welfare state is so enmeshed with society's other political and economic
institutions that it becomes difficult to single out the welfare state
as a target for change. Our analysis of the health and social service
industries indicates that we must reject the free market apologists'
almost exclusive focus on the demand side of the equation and instead,
concentrate on the supply side.15 The important issue is not so much
what consumers like or dislike but who controls the supply, i.e., who
controls the resources.
Public regulation has frequently been looked to as a means of
controlling the supply side of the private market. The history of public
regulation in the United States has been a spotty one where the process
of regulation has often been dominated by provider and corporate
interests. The question then remains: Are there effective changes and
strategies consonant with the political economy critique that can be
implemented given present political realities?
In the interest of brevity, I would like to answer this question
with an illustration from one of the areas we discussed earlier in the
article -- the health care sector of the welfare state. Navarro (1974)
has proposed several changes directed at the issue of who controls the
supply side of the health care market. He proposes to make the planning
and regulation of health care a public one instead of a private one,
albeit with a twist. Public planning and regulation would be geared
to (1) controlling the geographical and specialty distribution of health
practitioners, (2) controlling capital outlays and operating expenditures,
and (3) controlling the quality of health care. To avoid the pitfalls
that usually accompany public regulation, Navarro makes two recommenda-
tions: (1) that regulatory bodies be made administratively dependent
15
Free market-pluralist apologists often implicitly assume that the
existence of a market equilibrium also implies that the demand and supply
sides are roughly equal in their power to determine where the point of
equilibrium will be. The condition of equilibrium often conceals large
economic and social inequalities.
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on planning agencies, and (2) that planning councils -- the policy
bodies of planning agencies -- represent the communities they serve by
being comprised soley of democratically chosen "citizen-laymen," not
providers.
The thrust of Navarro's proposals is to move the planning and
regulation of health care from the dominance of medical care professionals
to the control of lay people. The emphasis on lay persons represents a
departure from present practice where advisory groups and planning
bodies are made up of providers and other individuals who share many
of the same class values and interests of providers. In short, Navarro
is not suggesting consumer participation but citizen control.
Navarro calls his plan, "institutional democracy." Implicit in this
concept is a skepticism of a regulatory and decision making process
that is now loaded in favor of provider class interests. He does not
favor governmental ownership of health care facilities. The National
Health Service experience in Great Britian has shown that public owner-
ship does not always guarantee public control, especially when appointees
to regional health authorities are drawn from the ranks of bankers,
business executives, real estate interests, physicians, military personnel,
and other professionals.
Generally speaking, those who share the political economy perspec-
tive are not always agreed as to how things should be changed. However,
political economists do share a common belief in the need for groups
and comnmunities to have a more meaningful role in determining how
public services are rendered. This belief is misplaced unless signifi-
cant changes are also accompanied by a transformation of social conscious-
ness that makes individual self-actualization and community well-being
among the primary criteria in social policy decision-making. This much
remains certain: important social goals are not the singular achievement
of a mechanistic, self-regulating market or its ally, the welfare state.
Individual and community well-being is too important to be left to the
beneficience of an invisible hand.
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